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DEFINING CONTROL
IN SECONDARY DISTRIBUTIONS
RUTH EFORD B. CAMPBELL, JR. *
Section 2(11) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Act)' generally sub-
jects the sale of securities by a person "controlling an issuer" to the
same rules that govern the sale of securities by an issuer. 2
 Accord-
ingly, before a "control" person may sell the securities he holds in the
controlled corporation • the must either register them with the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (Commission) 3 or qualify for an ex-
emption from the registration requirement.' While the Act clearly re-
quires that a "control" person either register or qualify for an exemp-
tion, it fails to define "control." Thus, the task of defining has fallen
to the Commission and to the courts. To date, as evidenced by the
apparent development of two definitions of control rather than one,
their definitional attempts have largely failed to provide a selling
shareholder with clear guidelines as to when he will be considered a
control person.
This article will initially discuss the two existing general defini-
tions of control and suggest that only one of these definitions pro-
vides both an understandable and workable norm. Factors which the
courts and the Commission have utilized in reaching a decision that a
selling shareholder is a control person will then be isolated and ex-
amined in terms of their utility as general indices of control under
each of the two definitions. Finally, two techniques to remedy the pres-
ent lack of certainty will be suggested.'
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; B.A. 1966, Centre College;
J.D. 1969, University of Kentucky; L.L.M. 1971, Harvard University.
' 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(11) (1970).
2
 Section 2(11) must be read in conjunction with §§ 4(1) and 5 of the Act. Section
5 makes offers and sales of securities illegal if the securities have not been registered by
the issuer with the Securities and Exchange Commission or if the offer or sale is not ac-
companied or preceded by a prospectus. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e)(1970). Section 4(1) states
that the provisions of § 5 shall apply only to issuers, underwriters and dealers. 15
U.S.C. § 77(d)(I) (1970). Section 2(11), in pertinent part, defines an underwriter as
"any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an
issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security ...." The section further
provides: "As used in this paragraph the term 'issuer' shall include ... any person di-
rectly or indirectly controlling ... the issuer." 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(11) (1970). The
cumulative effect of these sections is to require a control person who sells his securities
through an underwriter to comply with the requirements of § 5.
3
 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1970).
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(1)(1970) and Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1976),
promulgated thereunder. It is relevant to note that there are some differences between
the exemptions available to an issuer and the exemptions available to a control person.
For example, a control person is not permitted to use Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146
(1976), in the sale of his securities, Id. at Preliminary Note 6.
Securities sales by control persons are commonly referred to as "secondary dis-
tributions." 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 183 (1961). This term will be used
37
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I. CONTROL: TWO GENERAL DEFINITIONS
It appears that two definitions of control have been developed
by the courts and the Commission. The first of these defines control
in terms of the seller's ability to obtain registration. 9
 Under this test,
an individual is considered to be a control person if he or she can
cause the corporation to gather the information and to secure the ap-
propriate signatures required in a registration statement.' The second
definition, which focuses on the seller's power to direct the manage-
ment and policies of the corporation, has been expressly formulated
by the Commission in Rule 405 as "the possession, direct or indirect,
of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and
policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting se-
curities, by contract, or otherwise." Thus, whereas some courts appar-
ently place a premium on the seller's ability to obtain registration, 9
 the
Commission" and other courts" seemingly place a premium on the
seller's power to direct the corporation's management and policies."
While the two definitions of control—the ability to procure reg-
istration and the power to direct management . and policies—appear
to be different, they would be conceptually identical if the "power to
direct management" were defined as the ability to procure registra-
tion. Significantly, it can be inferred from some of the cases in which
the two tests have been considered together that courts have actually
equated the two definitions. For example, in S.E.C. v. Micro
-Moisture
Controls, Inc." the court found certain persons "in control because
they possessed and exercised the power to direct the management and
policies of Micro-Moisture (Rule 405) and particularly were in a posi-
tion to obtain the required signature of Micro-Moisture and its offi-
cers and directors on a registration statement." 14 Similarly, in S.E.C. v.
throughout this article to refer to such sales.
° See, e.g., SEC v. International Chem. Dev. Corp., 469 F.2d 20, 28, 30-31 (10th
Cir. 1972); Pennaluna & Co. v. SEC, 410 F.2d 861, 865, 866 (9th Cir. 1969); SEC v.
American Beryllium & Oil Corp., 303 F. Supp. 912, 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); SEC v. North
Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 106, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); SEC v. Micro-
Moisture Controls, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 558, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 780-81 (1961); E. MCCORMICK, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES ACT AND
THE SEC 69 (1948).
Professor Loss has characterized this as the "pragmatic" test generally applied
by the Commission. 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 557 (1961). This test also has
been characterized as the test "most universally accepted." 9 ALR Fed. 639, 645 (1971).
In other instances, it has been described as a "significant test." SEC v. International
Chem. Dev. Corp., 469 F.2d 20, 28 (10th Cir. 1972).
g 17 C.F.R. 230.405(f) (1976).
9 See note 6 supra,
"See, e.g., In re Thompson Ross Sec. Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111, 1119 (1940).
" See, e.g., SEC v. American Beryllium & Oil Corp., 303 F. Supp. 912, 915
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); SEC v. Computronic Indus. Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1136, 1139 (N.D.
Tex. 1968); SEC v. Franklin Atlas Corp., 154 F. Supp. 395, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
" Some commentators also have advocated this approach. See e.g., Sommer, Who's
In Cantro17—S.E.C., 21 Bus. LAw. 559, 582 (1966) (hereinafter cited as Sommer].
" 148 F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
14 hl. at 562.
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International Chemical Development Corp." the court treated an indi-
vidual as a control person not only because his "active participation in
the management of the [company]" was clearly shown, but also be-
cause "his ability to compel registration" was demonstrated." On the
other hand, at least one court appears not to have equated the two
definitions. In S.E.C. v. North American Research & Development Corp."
the court, without discussion of the two definitions, appears to have
utilized the ability to obtain registration norm in finding that the
corporation's majority shareholder was a control person and the
power to direct management standard in finding that the majority
shareholder's "business adviser" was a control person. 18
In light of the apparent confusion in the courts as to the ap-
propriate test of control, it is submitted that the relevant consideration
and appropriate definition of control should be the shareholder's abil-
ity to obtain registration. At least two reasons support this approach.
First, this definitional focus is seemingly more consistent with the
congressional intent underlying the imposition of the registration re-
quirement on control persons. Control persons appear to be subject to
the Act's registration requirement not only because of the dangers as-
sociated with a large distribution of securities, but also because control
persons are in a position to demand registration of the securities to be
offered." The most fundamental danger accompanying a large dis-
tribution of securities is the possibility that many purchasers will buy
securities without access to information about the issuer on which they
can base an informed investment decision. 2 ° To the extent, however,
that the seller is in a control relationship with the original issuer, it is
reasonable to assume that he can either force or persuade the issuer
to register the security and thereby insure that prospective purchasers
will have sufficient access to information on which to base their in-
vestment decisions. Indeed, the legislative history of the Act's control
provision, albeit somewhat meager, supports this assumption." The
House of Representative's Committee Report specifically states that an
offering by a control person
may possess all the dangers attendant upon a new offering
of securities. Wherever such a redistribution reaches sig-
15
 469 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1972).
"ld. at 30.
" 280 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
"Id. at 121.
19 S.E.C. PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS AND IN UNDERWRITINGS 21 (C.
Israels, ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as Israels]; Note, The Meaning of "Control" in the Pro-
tection of Investors, 60 Y ALE L.J. 311, 321. (1951).
" The purpose of the 1933 Act was to force disclosure necessary to remedy the
informational void. See 1 L. Loss. SECURITIES REGULATION 1-22, 107-28 (1961) for a dis-
cussion of how this and other dangers precipitated the 1933 Act. For a brief discussion
of the purpose and mechanics of the 1933 Act, see In The Matter of Ira Haupt & Co„
23 S.E.C. 589, 595 (1946).
"See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1933).
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nificant proportions, the distributor would be in the posi-
tion of controlling the issuer and thus able to furnish the
information demanded by the bill. This being so, the dis-
tributor is treated as equivalent to the original issuer and, if
he seeks to dispose of the issue through a public offering,
he becomes subject to the act."
In light of the Committee Report, it seems apparent that Con-
gress was willing to saddle a control person with the responsibility of
registering his securities because he could furnish the information re-
quired by the registration statement. By contrast, it is not clear that
one who has the power to direct the management and policies of a
corporation necessarily possesses the power to obtain registration. For
example, the owners of a corporation may hire a general manager to
run the corporation's day to day operations. Although the manager
may have the power to direct management, he may remain powerless
to obtain registration, since his office does not give him the power to
demand that the company register. It would seem both unfair and in-
consistent with the philosophy of section 2(1 1) to treat the hapless
general manager as a control person. Under the power to direct
management norm he would likely be treated as such. If, however,
the ability to obtain registration standard were utilized, he would not
be treated as a control person. Thus, the registration approach is
more precisely tailored to meet Congress' expressed intent than is the
power to direct management approach.
In addition to attaining philosophical consistency with the ap-
parent congressional intent underlying the imposition of the registra-
tion requirement on control persons, selection of the ability to obtain
registration approach provides an understandable, albeit general,
norm. A selling shareholder usually can determine whether he
reasonably can force or persuade the corporation to gather the in-
formation required in the registration statement and reasonably can
obtain the necessary signatures. In contrast, defining control as the
power to direct management leaves a fundamental question unan-
swered: what quantity and quality of management function must one
have in order to be deemed in control? Under the power to direct
management standard, a selling shareholder who directs a retail
corporation's sales promotions may wish to sell his small, less than one
percent, block of stock in the corporation. Assuming that this man-
agement function is his only connection with the corporation, other
than his small amount of stock, his control status would depend on
whether the power he wields in directing sales promotions sufficiently
constitutes power to direct management and policies. Although one
may have some intuitive feeling about his status, because Rule 405
fails to define what type of power is sufficient to support a finding of
control, it provides no basis for objectively determining if he is a con-
"Id.
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trot person. Moreover, the Commission has not sought to elucidate
the Rule. Under the ability to obtain registration norm, however, the
status of the director of sates promotions is less uncertain, although he
appears not to be a control person because he is in a position neither
to demand nor to persuade the corporation to register.
Thus, two reasons support selection of the ability to obtain reg-
istration norm and rejection of the power to direct management
standard. First, the registration norm is more consistent with the pol-
icy underlying the Act. Second, it is fairer to the selling shareholder
since it provides him with a more intelligible norm for determining
whether or not he is a control person and hence, whether or not he is
subject to the Act's registration requirement.
Although the ability to obtain registration definition is the more
workable norm, it has not been unanimously accepted." Accordingly,
a selling shareholder must presently examine other factors in order to
determine whether he or she is a control person. These factors fall
into three general categories: ownership interest, management posi-
tion and personal or business relationship. This article will isolate
these factors by examining decisions which the courts and the Com-
mission have reached in determining whether an individual is a con-
trol person within the meaning of section 2(1 1). 24
INDIVIDUAL CONTROL
A. Bases for Individual Control
1. Ownership Interest in the Corporation
Perhaps the most obvious factor providing a basis For individual
control is an ownership interest in the particular company, since an
ownership. interest typically gives the shareholder power both to vote
for directors and to vote on some important corporate decisions. 25 It
is well settled that unless there has been some delegation of voting
power, an individual who has 51 percent of the voting stock of a
company is a control person because he has the power to elect a ma-
jority of the board of directors, 26 and hence, the power to either ob-
tain registration or direct the management and policies of the com-
pany. It is clear, however, that a shareholder with less than 51 percent
of the voting stock of a corporation can be a control person for the
23
 See text at notes 9-12 supra.
24
 A detailed discussion of each category begins with the text at note 25 eufta.
" One commentator has observed that "[Ole initial source of power of necessity
must be ownership of voting securities.... The Power of management is ultimately .
in the hands of the holders of voting securities." Sommer, supra note 12, at 566-67.
"Id. at 567. In SEC v. North Am, Research & Dev. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 106
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), the court found that. South Utah Mines was in control of North
American because "it owned more than 50% of the outstanding shares of North Ameri-
can ...."Id. at 121.
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purposes of section 2(1 1). In In re Thompson Ross Securities Co.," for
example, the Commission stated that " Iciontror is not synonymous
with the ownership of 51 percent of the voting stock of a
corporation." 28 Yet, it is impossible to declare with certainty that any
particular percentage less than 51 percent will be sufficient for con-
trol. Historically, the courts and the Commission have found control
to exist where the percentages of ownership have been substantially
below 51 percent." For example, in United States v. Wolfson" and
S.E.C. v. Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc. 31 persons or groups with 40 to 50
percent ownership were treated as control persons. 32 Yet, in the
Thompson Ross proceedings, the Commission treated an indi-
vidual who owned 18 percent as a control person. 33 Finally, in United
States v. Sherwood," the court refused to find control where the selling
27 6 S.E.C. 1111 (1940).
28 Id. at 1119.
29 In U.S. v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968), and SEC v. Micro-Moisture
Controls, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), affd sub nom., SEC v. Culpepper, 270
F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959), the persons or groups with stock ownership of 40 to 50% were
found to be control persons. Wolfson at 781; Micro-Moisture at 738. In In re Thompson
Ross Securities Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111 (1940), the Commission found control under'] 2(11)
where the particular individual owned 18% of the voting stock. Id. at 1120. However,
there were a number of other factors that were important to the determination that
Allen had control of the company. The Commission stated:
"Allen is president of the issuer and its largest stockholder .... He
was in complete charge of its affairs; for years he had managed the issuer
and formulated its policies .... Allen held proxies For over 50% of the
outstanding shares."
Id. at 1120-21.
In U.S. v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), the court refused to find
control where there was only 8% ownership. Id. at 483. Factors other than stock owner-
ship were also emphasized by the court, which stated that Sherwood
was unable to secure representation on the board of directors, he had had
a falling-out with John Christopher Doyle, who appears to have been the
dominant figure in the management of Canadian Javelin Limited, and
Sherwood was unable to free the bulk of his shares for distribution until
Doyle consented thereto.
Id. In Wellington Tech. Indus., Inc., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC, L. REP.,
1 78,039, at 80,269 (SEC 1971), the Commission, in a no-action letter, permitted an un-
registered sale of securities where the seller owned 6.7%. Id. Similar no-action responses
can be found in instances where the seller owned 5.4%, Amerada Hess Corp., (1970-71
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP., 1 78,083, at 80,349 (SEC 1971), and 3.2%,
Weil-McLain Co., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP., 1 78,038, at
80,266-67 (SEC 1971). No-action letters are responses by the Commission's staff "to pri-
vate inquiries as to whether a certain transaction could be carried out in a specified
manner. These responses are known as 'no-action' letters because they customarily state
that the staff will recommend no action to the Commission if the transaction is done in
the specified manner." D. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION 18 (1975).
" 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968).
31 167 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), affd sub. nom., S.E.C. v. Culpepper, 270
F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959).
32 Wolfson at 781; Micro-Moisture at 738.
" 6 S.E.C. at 1120.
34 175 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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shareholder owned only 8 percent of the voting stock." Thus, al-
though it is impossible to declare that any particular percentage less
than 51 percent will be sufficient for a finding of control, it can be in-
ferred from these examples and other decisions that when an indi-
vidual owns 10 percent or more of the voting stock of a company, he
may be treated as a control person. This inference is also consistent
with the writings in this area which generally have suggested that
ownership of 10 percent of the voting stock of a company should be
considered a "red light" signaling that there is a danger of control
status."
Still, one cannot accurately determine whether control is present
by merely quantifying stock ownership. The distribution of the
corporation's voting securities also has an impact on control. Former
SEC Commissioner Sommer observed that as voting stock becomes
more widely dispersed, the amount necessary to control becomes
smaller." Conversely, as the voting securities become concentrated in
fewer shareholders, the percentage of stock that any one shareholder
would need to be a control person increases. Thus, a person with 25
percent of a widely-held company would be more likely to be a con-
trol person than would a 25 percent owner of a company with only 5
shareholders.
Another important factor that may affect control is the type of
security owned by the shareholder. if the security gives the individual
the power to either obtain registration or direct the management and
policies of the corporation he may be treated as a control person.
Thus, if convertible debentures, nonconvertible debentures, or non-
voting preferred stock confers such power on the holder, he may be a
control person since power is a key.ingredient of control. Whichever
definition of control one adopts, power is important, since it can pro-
vide a means to demand registration or to direct the management of
the corporation. To the extent, therefore, that ownership of any se-
curity, whether debt or equity, preferred or common, voting or non-
voting, generates power, that ownership is relevant to the issue of
control.
The power accompanying different types of securities depends
on the contractual terms of the security as well as the existing corpo-
rate realities. Quite clearly, one owning 51 percent of the common
stock of a corporation has more power than does one who owns 51
percent of the non-voting preferred stock since the contractual vot-
ing rights of the common shareholder give him control over the
board of directors. Similarly, corporate realities may become important
33 Id. at 483.
36 See, Enstam & Kamen, Control and the Institutional Investor, 23 Bus. LAW. 289,
315 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Enstam & Kamen, Sommer, supra note 12, at 568. It
even has been suggested by one commentator that 5% is the relevant figure. Israels,
supra note 19, at 19.
37
 Sommer, supra note 12, at 569.
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in the case of convertible debentures; as the conversion ratio becomes
more attractive, the power of the convertible debenture owner in-
creases. When conversion becomes a real possibility, it gives the owner
of the convertible debentures increased power. Thus, there might well
be instances in which holders of non-voting securities could be found
to have sufficient power to warrant a finding that they are control
persons. 38
Thus, it is apparent that an ownership interest in a corporation
is a factor that is relevant to the determination of control, irrespective
of the definition of control adopted. There are indications that own-
ership of 10 percent or more of a corporation subjects the sharehold-
er to some risk of being a control person. One must, however, treat
that as a crude rule of thumb, since other factors are relevant to the
ultimate determination of control. These other factors include dis-
tribution of ownership and the type of contractual rights enjoyed by
the particular shareholder.
2. Officer or Director
A seller's management position with a corporation often is em-
phasized as an important factor in determining control." Although in
determining whether an individual is a control person the courts typi-
cally emphasize positions such as an officer, director or member of an
executive committee,4 ° an untitled, de facto management position is
also important:" While it generally is agreed that occupying a sig-
nificant management position is a factor of control, the weight to be
accorded to one's position as an officer or director is less than clear.
Professor Loss has stated that "although a person's being an officer or
director does not create any presumption of control, it is a sort of red
light."42 On the other hand, there is some case authority which sup-
"See Enstam & Kamen, supra note 36, at 316-17.
3 ' Former Commissioner Sommer has discussed the problem in terms of whether
being an officer or director will "automatically constitute one a member of the control-
ling group." Sommer, supra note 12, at 576-77. See also cases cited at note 43 infra. As
will be suggested infra, this consideration unnecessarily confuses the analysis. See text at
note 51 infra.
15 See, e.g., SEC v. International Chem. Dev. Corp., 469 F.2d 20, 31 (10th Cir.
1972); SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 334 F. Supp. 444, 449, 450, 452 (N.D.
Tex. 1971); SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 106, 121 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); U.S. v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); In re Thompson Ross
Sec. Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111, 1119 (1940).
" In U.S. v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968), the court, in deciding to sub-
ject Wolfson to the constraints of ti 2(11), found that although Wolfson was not an of-
ficer or director he was the corporation's "guiding spirit." Id. at 781. In SEC v. Franklin
Atlas Corp., 154 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), the court found that an individual (John
L. de Lyra) who was not an officer or director was a control person, due at least in sub-
stantial part, to the fact that through his sister he exercised de facto control over the
management of the corporation. Id. at 400-401. In addition to personal relationships,
business relationships can also be a basis for finding de facto control. See text at notes
56-57 infra.
42 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 781 (1961).
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ports the notion that one who is an officer or director is by definition
a control person. 43 Indeed, one court stated that "the Commission de-
fined 'control' and all of its derivations to include at the very least any
officer or director of the issuer."'" Such a finding, however, is against
the weight of authority, which indicates that an individual's position is
an important but not a determinative factor in ascertaining whether
one is a control person."
In evaluating the significance of a seller's position as an officer
or director of a corporation, the selection of the appropriate defini-
tion of control becomes crucial. If control is defined as the ability to
direct the management of the corporation, a seller's status as an of-
ficer or director has obvious significance. Since directors and officers
usually have at least some power to direct the management and
policies of a corporation, arguably, virtually every director and major
officer is a control person within the meaning of section 2(11). Such a
result, however, is inconsistent with the better view that a position as
an officer or director is an important but not a determinative factor."
It also is inconsistent with the legislative purpose underlying the spe-
cial constraints imposed on control persons by section 2(11),47 which
indicates that the constraints should be imposed only where the selling
shareholder can secure registration." One's office or directorship
alone does not generate such power."
If, on the other hand, control is defined as the ability to procure
registration, an individual's status as an officer or director may be less
significant. Since registration requires the signature of a majority of
the board of directors, as well as certain, enumerated officers," no
single officer or director can, through the exercise of the power of his
office, force registration. The voting stock owned by the officer or di-
rector may give him the power to force registration, but his office
"See, e.g., SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 334 F. Supp. 444, 452, 458
(N.D. Tex. 1971): SEC v. Computronic Indus. Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1136, 1139 (N.D.
Tex. 1968).
" SEC v. Computronic Indus. Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1136, 1139 (N.D. Tex. 1968).
It also appears that sonic persons in SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 334 F.
Supp. 444, 452, 458 (N.D. Tex. 1971) were held to be in control because they occupied
positions as officers and directors.
43
 In Wilko v. Swan, 127 F. Supp. 55, 56.58, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), a court upheld
a special verdict that Page, who was both a director and stockholder, was not a control
person. See also, 2 L. Loss, SEcoRrnEs REGULATION 781 (1961); Enstam & Kamen, supra
note 36, at 306 ("Representation on the board has been held to be one factor which will
be weighed ....").
"See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 127 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) See also note 45 supra.
41 See text at notes 19-22 supra.
" Id.
41' See text at notes 50-51 infra,
a° The instructions to the S-1 Registration Form state: "The registration state-
ment shall be signed by the registrant, its principal executive officer or officers, its
principal financial officer, its controller or principal accounting officer and by at least
the majority of the board of directors or persons performing similar functions." 2 CCH
FED. SEG. L. REP. II 7126, at 6221.
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alone does not. This is not to say, however, that one's status as an of-
ficer or director is irrelevant to the ability to obtain registration. Obvi-
ously, it gives one the power to obtain his own signature and support.
Additionally, one's status as an officer or director can generate per-
sonal contacts with other officers and directors. These personal con-
tacts atone can cause the director or officer to be in a position to ob-
tain the necessary signatures and cause the company to gather the
necessary information." It is important to keep in mind, however,
that this ability to obtain registration stems from relationships with
other corporate officials and not from the power of the office itself.
Thus, if the ability to obtain registration norm is utilized, the assess-
ment of whether an officer or director is in control requires an
analysis of his personal and business relationships with the other cor-
porate officials. Such an analysis may show the particular officer or
director is a minority director who is despised by a majority of the
board and all the major officers. In such an instance, the director
should not be deemed a control person.52 -
3. Relationships
It is quite possible that an individual with little or no voting stock
ownership could be a control person due to his relationship with the
corporation or with the person or persons who have control of the
corporation. This type of control by relationship can occur in several
situations. Control, for example, could be based upon a contractual
relationship. A loan to a majority shareholder could be a basis for
control by contractual relationship if, under the terms of the loan a-
greement, the lender acquires the right to exercise the power of that
majority shareholder.53
It also is conceivable that a lender could extract such extensive
covenants from a corporate borrower that the lender would attain
control over the borrowing corporation. Typically, however, this is not
the case. Since the covenants are usually limited to restrictions on fu-
ture indebtedness, payment of future dividends, etc.," the lender
generally would be unable to secure -registration or to direct the man-
agement of the company. Accordingly, the lender would not appear
to be a control person, at least in the typical loan situation.
51
 Relationships as a basis for control are discussed in the text at notes 53-67
infra.
52 Cf. Sommer, supra note 12, at 576-77.
53 /d. at 571. An obvious example of a mechanism used to transfer power in this
setting is the delivery of a proxy by the borrower to the lender. The fact that the seller
of securities "held proxies of over 50 percent of the outstanding shares" was em-
phasized as an important factor in determining control status in In re Thompson Ross
Sec. Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111, 1 .121 (1940). Former Commissioner Sommer also has stated
that "someone who has an irrevocable proxy or right by contract to exercise such an
amount 'of voting power will be a controlling person even though he may not own ben-
eficially a single share." Sommer, supra note 12, at 571.
54 See Enstam & Kamen, supra note 36, at 319-25.
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Control based on a contractual relationship is not limited to loan
situations. A majority shareholder could, for example, relinquish his
control by placing his stock in a voting trust. In that instance, it ap-
pears that the trustee, and not the majority shareholder, would oc-
cupy the control relationship with the corporation. 55
Non-contractual relationships also can cause an otherwise insig-
nificant shareholder to be treated as a control person. S.E.C.. v. North
American Research & Development Corp." exemplifies the role that busi-
ness relationships can play in determining whether an individual is a
control person. There, the court relied upon an individual's status as
a "business adviser" to the company's majority shareholder as an im-
portant basis to support its finding of the existence of control. 57
Courts also have emphasized family and personal relationships as one
of several bases for control. In S.E.C. v. Antoine Silver Mines, Ltd.," the
court found that a father was a controlling person of two corpora-
tions, stating that his "status as a controlling person is indicated by his
son's beneficial ownership of all shares of these, companies ....""
Similarly, in S.E.C. v. National Bankers Life Insurance Co." the court
founded the existence of an individual's control on the fact that his
son-in-law owned a controlling stock interest in the company." Addi-
tionally, the absence of a personal relationship has been an important
factor in a court's decision to find individual control. In United States
v. Sherwood," for example, the court refused to find that the defend-
ant was a control person for several reasons, including the fact that
he had suffered a "falling-out" with the individual who appeared to
have been the dominant figure in the company's management."
These examples of non-contractual relationships are not
exhaustive." Yet when considered along with the examples of con-
" In Micro-Moisture, 148 F. Supp. at 562, the court stated that an individual
(Louis Levin) "stood in the position of a controlling person," apparently due to the fact
that he was sole voting trustee of 998,210 shares of the common stock of Micro-
Moisture. Id. at 562. See also Enstam & Kamen, supra note 36, at 318; Sommer, supra
note 12, at 570.
58
 280 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
51 1d. at 121. More precisely, Robert Johnson was the business adviser to the par-
ent company's controlling shareholder. Id. For further discussion of this case see note
70 infra.
58
 299 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. III. 1968).
"Id. at 416 n.l. For further discussion of this case see note 69 infra.
60 334 F. Supp. 444 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
01 Id. at 449. It also is relevant to note that the son-in-law's ownership interest in
the company had been financed by a bank controlled by his father-in-law. Id. at 449.
For further discussion of this case see note 69 infra.
82 175 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
"ki. at 483. For further discussion of this case see note 68 infra.
84
 Former Commissioner Sommer has said . that a substantial customer could
perhaps be a control person where "it has the power to dictate the policies of the cor-
poration." Sommer, Who's "In Control"?—S.E.C., 21 Bus. LAW. 559, 573 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Sommer]. In SEC v. National Bankers Life 'Ins. Co., 334 F. Supp.
444, 452 (N.D. Tex. 1971) the court held that Tom Max Thomas was a controlling
shareholder, emphasizing that he was "general counsel" to the company.
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tractual relationships, they indicate that certain types of relationships
do provide a basis for control. In some instances, relationships can
give a shareholder the raw power to demand the assistance of another
in his attempt to cause the issuer to register. This is illustrated by
the examples of contractual relationships. In the more typical situa-
tion, however, relationships do not give the selling shareholder the
raw power to demand registration. Rather, the relationships provide a
shareholder with the means of persuading one with power to aid him
in his attempt to secure registration. Thus, if an analysis of a selling
shareholder's relationship with one who has the raw power to secure
registration reveals that it is reasonable to assume that the selling
shareholder could persuade that person to aid him in his attempt to
obtain registration, the selling shareholder should be treated as a con-
trol person. For example, a husband reasonably can be expected to
obtain registration if his wife is the majority shareholder of a com-
pany. Likewise, a shareholder who is a long-time business associate
and friend of a majority shareholder may be in a position to enlist the
aid of the majority shareholder. In sum, if control is defined as the
ability to obtain registration, relationships are important in determin-
ing whether one is in control of a corporation, since the ability to ob-
tain registration can be based on the raw power to command or the
ability to persuade."
Under the alternative definition of control — the power to direct
management — relationships also can be a basis for control. For ex-
ample, it may be reasonable to conclude that one family member
could persuade another family member to manage a company in a
certain way. Likewise, it may be possible for one who lends money to
a corporation to extract some power to direct management. This
analysis, however, demonstrates the lack of clarity of the power to di-
rect management norm. Under this definitional approach it must be
determined whether the relationship is of such strength that a selling
shareholder has the power to direct management. Such a judgment
usually is impossible because the power to direct management norm
does not explicate what functions one must control in order to be
within the definition of a control person. Thus, it is unclear, for ex-
ample, whether a selling shareholder who has a brother who owns 75
percent of the voting stock of the corporation would be found to have
the power to direct the management of the corporation if his brother
would accede to his request to change the brand of automobiles used
by the corporation and also would accede to a request to fire a par-
55 One commentator has stated:
['Me control test is really a device to reach those cases in which the peo-
ple who are making an offer are in a position, whether it is by persuasion
or by a stock control relationship or some other reason, to provide
... reliable information through the filing of a registration statement by
the issuer.
S.E.C. PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS AND IN UNDERWRITINGS 21 (C. lsraels,
ed.) (statement by Mr. Cohen) [hereinafter cited as Israels].
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ticular vice-president of the company. If this is the limit of the per-
suasive power of' the selling shareholder, would he have the power to
direct management? The problem in answering that question is that
the underlying norm—the power to direct management—does not
explicate which function the selling shareholder must control in order
to be a control person. The ability to obtain registration standard,
however, provides a more understandable norm." Additionally, the
ability to obtain registration standard is consistent with the congres-
sional intent underlying imposition of the registration requirement on
control persons."
B. The Red Light District for Individual Control.
Relatively little difficulty is encountered in recognizing the fac-
tors that are relevant to a determination that an individual is a control
person, since the cases delineate the factors with reasonable clarity.
The difficulty arises, however, in determining whether the factors are
present in sufficient quantity and intensity to cause the selling
shareholder to be treated as a control person. Although it is most dif-
ficult to define in the abstract those situations in which a selling
shareholder will be deemed a control person, an analysis of pertinent
case law gives rise to a general understanding of how the courts and
the Commission have dealt with the control issue.
The cases indicate that if none of the three factors—ownership
interest, management position and personal or business rela-
tionship—is present, a selling shareholder is unlikely to be de-
clared a control person." If, however, one of these factors is present,
there is a substantial risk that a selling shareholder will be declared a
control person." The presence of two or more factors usually results
68 See text following note 22 supra.
" See text at notes 19-22 supra.
86 See e.g., Wellington Technical Indus., Inc. [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. V 78,039, at 80,269 (SEC 1971); Amerada Hess Corp., [197041
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 178,083 at 80,348 (SEC 1971); U.S. v. Sher-
wood, 175 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). In Sherwood the court found that Sherwood
was not a control person since he had none of the three bases for control. He owned
"8% of the stock of the company, he was unable to secure a representation on the
board of directors, land] he had a falling-out with John Christopher Doyle, who ap-
pears to have been the dominant figure in the management" of the company. Id. at
483. In Wellington, the staff of the commission issued a no-action letter to Enterprise
Fund, Inc., which held 6.7% of Wellington's stock. [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. I 78,039, at 80,269. No other connection between the two companies
was disclosed by the letter or the response. The staff of the Commission also issued a
no-action letter in Amerada Hess. Amerada Hess owned about 5.4% of the outstanding
shares of Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. [1970.71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. L.
REP. l 78,083, at 80,349. No other connection between the two companies was dis-
closed.
"See, e.g., Pennaluna & Co. v. SEC, 410 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1969); SEC v. Na-
tional Bankers Life Ins. Co., 334 F. Supp. 444 (N.D. Tex. 1971); SEC v. Antoine Silver
Mines Ltd., 299 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. 111. 1968); SEC v. Computronic Indus. Corp., 294
F. Supp. 1136 (N.D. Tex. 1968). In National Bankers Life the court held that an indi-
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in a determination that a particular individual is a control person. 7°
vidual (Frank W. Sharp) was in control of Olympic Life Insurance Company stating
that he "exercised control over OLI through ownership of controlling stock in that
company by W.D. Haden, II, Sharp's son-in-law ...." 334 F. Supp. at 449. Although it
was not emphasized by the court, it was noted that the son-in-law's ownership of the
stock was financed by a bank in which his father-in-law had the controlling interest. Id.
Thus, this case can be classified as either a one or two factor case. The court also held
that an individual (John Osorio) was in control of National Bankers Life Insurance
Company, apparently because of his position as president, director and member of the
executive and finance committees. Id. at 450. In Antoine Silver Mines the court declared
an individual (Joseph Kopas) to be a controlling persoh of Alladin Holdings, Ltd., stat-
ing that his control was "indicated by his son's beneficial ownership of all shares of ...
[the] company." 299 F. Supp. at 416 n.l. In Computronic the court seemed to find con-
trol solely because the selling shareholder was chairman of the board of Computronic.
The court stated: "[T]he Commission defined 'control' and all its derivations to include
at the very least any officer or director of the issuer." 294 F. Supp. at 1139. In
Pennaluna the court found that an individual (Magnuson) was a control person on May
8, 1962. 410 F.2d at 866. At that time, he was only a nominal shareholder and was
neither an officer nor director. He did, however, have a significant relationship with
the group of persons in control of the company. Id. at 865-66. Although the court ap-
pears to have treated this as a "group" case, declaring the individual to be a member of
a control group because of his relationship with its members, id. at 866, it is submitted
that the court's analysis is conceptually indistinguishable from the determination that an
individual has control because of a relationship. See text at notes 53-67 supra.
7 ° Cases in which control was an issue can be categorized according to the
number of control factors present. It should be noted, however, that some cases do not
fit squarely into any particular category.
THREE CONTROL FACTORS:
United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946
(1969). Defendant Wolfson was found to be a control person, apparently because he
had a significant stock ownership, a relationship with another stockholder (the court
said Wolfson, members of his immediate family and a man characterized as his "first
lieutenant" owned over 40% of the stock) and a significant management function (the
court characterized him as the corporation's "guiding spirit"). Id. at 781.
SEC v. International Chem. Dev. Corp., 469 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1972). Defendant
Richard T. Garda!l was considered a control person of International Chemical, appar-
ently because he owned approximately one-sixth of the outstanding stock, was an active
participant in the management of the company and had a past business and personal
relationship with other substantial shareholders. Id. at 30. Another defendant (Joseph
A. Holman) also was found to be a control person of International Chemical, appar-
ently because he had a substantial ownership interest (part of which was an ownership
in a company that held a substantial share of International Chemical), played an active
role in the management of the company and had a business relationship with other
shareholders and officers of International Chemical. Id. at 31.32.
In In re Thompson Ross Sec. Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111 (1940), the Commission declared
that the defendant was a control person because he owned 18% of the stock of the
company, was its president ("for years he had managed the issuer and formulated its
policies"), and had been able to secure proxies for over 50% of the outstanding shares
at recent meetings. Id. at 1120-21.
TWO CONTROL FACTORS:
SEC v. International Chem. Dev. Corp., 469 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1972). The court
found an individual (Ray L. Pruett) a control person of International Chemical, appar-
ently because he had performed a significant management function (he had served as
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Thus, for example, if the selling shareholder has 10 percent of the
voting stock of the corporation, performs a significant management
function in the corporation, or has a significant relationship with its
management or a 10 percent shareholder, there is a substantial risk
that he will be treated as a control person by a court or the Commis-
sion.
While numerous cases support these conclusions," a rational
analysis of whether a selling shareholder is a control person cannot be
limited to a quantification of the control factors present. The intensity
of any one factor is an important additional consideration. For exam-
ple, if' a shareholder's only basis for control is voting securities, the
probability of his being a control person increases as his percentage of
ownership increases. Thus, if' he owns 35 percent, he is more likely to
be declared a control person than if he owns only 10 percent.
Because it is impossible to pinpoint what quantity and intensity
of' factors will cause a court or the Commission to treat a selling
secretary-treasurer and director of the company and had played a generally active role
in the running of the company), and had a personal and business relationship with
other substantial shareholders (he was part of the original group that purchased large
amounts of the stock of the company with the intent to resell that stock to the general
public). Id. at 30-31. There also were other less significant connections with the com-
pany that may have been important. He had owned one or two percent of the
company's stock and had some connection with a company that owned a substantial
amount of International Chemical stock, although his exact connection with that com-
pany is less than clear from the case. Id.
SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 334 F. Supp. 444 (N. D. Tex. 1971). An
individual (Tom Max Thomas) was found to be in a control relationship with South At-
lantic company, apparently because he was the secretary of the company and had busi-
ness dealings with other substantial stockholders (John Osorio and Waggoner Carr) who
were associated with him in the practice of law and other business interests. Id. at 447,
452. Moreover, the court stated that "those substantial shareholders had "purchased
control of South Atlantic Company ...." Id. at 447. It appears that the individual in
question had no major stock interest in the cUrnpany since the court did not refer to it.
The same court also found that this individual was in control of Master Control, Inc.,
apparently, because he was in a management position (he was secretary, general counsel
and director), and was a business companion of the individual who was the controlling
shareholder of Master Control's parent company. Id. at 452, 458.
SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). An
individual (Robert A. Johnson) was found to be a control person of North American,
apparently because of his control relationship with North American's parent company,
South Utah.' He was a director and officer of South Utah and "business advisor" to the
person who owned 70% of South Utah. Id. at 121.
SEC v. Franklin Atlas Corp., 154 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). The court held
that an individual (John L. de Lyra) was in control of Franklin. Id. at 401, Although it
is not entirely clear, it appears that this individual had a family relationship with major
stockholders and was active in the management of the company. See, id. at 399-401. His
stock ownership is not clear. For more factual details see also SEC v. Franklin Atlas
Corp., 171 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Wilko v. Swan, 127 F. Supp. 55 (D. Conn..1953). The court upheld a special jury
verdict in which a director and stockholder was found not to be in a control relation.
ship with Air Associates, Inc. Id. at 56-57, 60. The percentage of stock he owned was
not disclosed,
" See notes 68.70 supra.
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shareholder as a control person, a quantification-intensity analysis
leaves the status of many shareholders uncertain. To alleviate this un-
certainty, it is urged that the control analysis utilize one final
touchstone—the ability to obtain registration. Interjection of this
norm into the control analysis would alleviate the present uncertainty
surrounding the determination of who is a control person since it
provides a consistent and objective point of reference by which to
evaluate a selling shareholder's control bases. If, after isolating the
shareholder's bases, it is reasonable to assume that he has the power
to demand registration or persuade those who have the power, he is a
control person. Indeed, an analysis based on the facts and outcome
and not the language of many reported cases suggests that some
courts do interject this norm into the analysis, since those cases
generally are consistent with the notion that a shareholder with the
ability to obtain registration is a control person."
" This conclusion is drawn from an analysis of the cases discussed at notes 68-70
supra. Rule 160 of the Wheat Report, SEC Disclosure Group, "Disclosure to
investors—A Reappraisal of Federal Administrative Policies under the '33 and '34
Acts," CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. app. VI-I (1969) [hereinafter cited as the Wheat Report),
which has not been adopted, excluded from the definition of control person a seller
who was not an officer, director, 10% shareholder, or person with a substantial rela-
tionship to any of the foregoing. See note 102 infra. A note to Rule 160 gives examples
of situations in which persons with some bases for control should not be considered
control persons. Those examples support the inference that the ability to obtain regis-
tration is important.
Example one: Dr. A, a distinguished chemist, is "vice president in
charge of research" of the X Company, a producer of chemicals. The ex-
tent of Dr. A's participation in the management of the business as distin-
guished from the scientific side of the company's affairs is limited to advis-
ing the other officers and occasionally the directors as to the commercial
feasibility of possible new products and processes. Dr. A is not a director
of the company nor is he related by blood or marriage to any of its direc-
tors or officers. His holdings of X's voting securities (when computed in
accordance with this rule) do not reach the 10% level referred to therein.
Although Dr. A may be an executive officer of the X Chemical
Company, he is not a person "directly or indirectly controlling" the com-
pany for purposes of Section 2(1 1) of the Securities Act. Since his role in
the company is purely scientific, his influence over its management and
policies is insufficient to be deemed controlling for Securities Act pur-
poses. The result might be difkrent if X were primarily a research organi-
zation as, for example, if it were primarily in the business of doing chemi-
cal research for others on a fee basis.
Example two: Messrs. C and D are directors of Z Company. They
represent a group which owns about 20% of Z's voting securities. Another
group associated with the Z family and with Z Company's executives owns
55% of Z's voting securities. Messrs. C and D have no allies on Z's I1-man
board of directors. They owe their directorship solely to the fact that Z's
certificate of incorporation provides for cumulative voting and they have
been unable to get the board to accept their proposals.
C and D are not in control of Z.
Example three: Mr. E is the publisher of the leading daily newspaper
in the city of K. Although journalism is his principal occupation, Mr. E
also spends much time and energy in civic work and is regarded as one of
the city's prominent citizens. At the request of its president, Mr. E has be-
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III. BASES FOR GROUP CONTROL
A number of court and administrative decisions have recognized
that membership in a control group requires that a person who lacks
individual control of a corporation nevertheless be treated as a control
person." This treatment is consistent with the House of Representa-
come a director of the K Machinery Company, one of the largest em-
ployers in K. The management of the•machinery company wanted Mr. E on
the board because it valued his demonstrated business judgment and
knowledge of the community. Mr. E is unrelated to the officers or princi-
pal stockholders of the machinery company. He holds approximately 2%
of the company's outstanding common stock. He spends relatively little
time on the company's affairs apart from attendance at directors' meet-
ings. He is not an officer of the company.
On these facts, Mr. E is not a controlling person of K Machinery
Company.
Example 'Our: Mr. and Mrs. E and their children sold their family-
owned business to the X Corporation several years ago. As a result of that
transaction the E family acquired 25% of X's stock. Mr. E thereupon re-
tired from business to devote himself to various charitable endeavors in
which he had long been interested. Neither he nor any member of his
family serves as either an officer or a director of X Corporation. X
Corporation's officers occasionally consult Mr. E with respect to the affairs
of the segment of the corporation's business formerly operated by Mr. E.
The Corporation's voting securities are held as follows:
Mr. E and his family	 25%
Public investors
	 22%
The X family, which consists of
the descendants of the founder
of X Corporation and whose
members act as a unit	 53%
TOTAL.	 100%
It is reasonably clear that the X Corporation is controlled by the X
family and that in spite of its substantial holdings the E family has no
dominion over the enterprise. Accordingly, the members of the E family
are not deemed to be controlling persons of X Corporation for '33 Act
purposes.
Example five: Mr. F, the founder of F, Inc. was its president for
many years. He still owns 25% of F, Inc.'s voting securities. Some years
ago however, Mr. G, an investment banker and a group of his associates
accumulated about 45% of F, Inc.'s stock. The balance of the stock is
widely distributed. As a result of a proxy contest between Mr. F and his
friends, on the one hand, and the C group on the other, the founder and
his closest associates were removed from the board and from their execu-
tive positions with the company. The present board consists of Mr. C, his
nominees and two representatives of institutional investors who hold sub-
stantial blocks of the company's securities and were allied with Mr. G in
the proxy contest.
Mr. F has ceased to be a controlling person of F, Inc.
"See, e.g., U.S. v, Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779, 781-82 (2d Cir. 1968); U.S. v. Mardi,
330 F.2d 316, 325 (2d Cir. 1964); SEC v. American Berylium & Oil Corp., 303 F. Supp.
912, 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); SEC v, Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 716, 718,
738 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); affd sub nom. SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959); In
re Thompson Ross Sec. Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111, 1119-20 (1940).
Id.
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Lives Committee Report, which stated that the distributor of securities
should be treated as "equivalent to the original issuer" where a con-
trolling interest is "owned by one individual or a select group of
individuals."" The determination of whether a group exists is the
same as the determination of whether there is a significant relation-
ship between a selling shareholder and another party. In both, the
question should be: is there such a relationship between the selling
shareholder and another person or persons that it is reasonable to
presume that the selling shareholder can enlist the help of the other
person or persons in securing registration. If that relationship exists,
the characteristics of the person or group of persons should be im-
puted to the selling shareholder. Thus, for example, if a group con-
sists of three members, each of whom has 10 percent of the voting
stock, each would be treated as if he owned 30 percent of the voting
stock.
Although it is clear that characteristics of the entire group are to
be attributed to each member, the factors that generate the existence
of a group are uncertain. A number of legal scholars and experts in
the area have sought to develop a workable norm by which to charac-
terize group control. For example, in stating what they consider to be
the clearest case of group control, two commentators have written that
"there is no controversy" over the fact that "control may be exercised
by a cohesive group working together."" Former Commissioner
Sommer expressed a similarly general view, suggesting that "there
must be some homogeneity among individuals if they are to be re-
garded as members of the controlling group, some significant business
characteristic or relationship or course of conduct that affords an
element of unity."" It also has been said that "an essential element of
a controlling group is a demonstrated propensity to act together in
concert with respect to the exercise of the group's power to control."' 7
None of these statements, however, provides a workable norm for de-
fining a control group. While all of them appear to require some
unity of action, none indicates the type of unified conduct that would
cause a court to find a group. Would any of the above commentators
suggest, for example, that there was a group simply because four
shareholders had gotten together to raise money for the Cancer
Fund? Would the result be different if they agreed at a shareholder's
meeting that the corporation should attempt to obtain new financing
from a bank or if there had been unanimous agreement on all corpo-
rate issues since .the incorporation of the business?'g Do any of these
74 H.R. REP, No, 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1933).
75
 Enstam & Kamen, supra note 36, at 308.
78 Sommer, supra note 64, at 577.
" 9 ALR Fed. 639, 661 (1971).
78
 One commentator has stated that "if [a shareholder] has always worked in con-
junction with the other members of the board who are definitely in control and has
never opposed management, I think he would be considered a controlling person." Is-
raels, supra note 65, at 10.
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activities demonstrate such unity that a shareholder should be re-
quired to register his stock prior to sale?
To answer these questions, a close analysis of the cases in which
the group notion has been used to declare that a particular entity was
a control person may be helpful." However, since these cases contain
neither a generalized nor workable norm for calculating an
individual's status as a group member, the utility of such an analysis
lies in isolating the factors which have been most often emphasized as
bases for declaring an individual a member of a control group. A
number of cases have found a group in instances where shareholders
have worked in concert to distribute their stock. In United Stales v.
Dardi, 8° for example, the Second Circuit found that three persons
were a controlling group for purposes of section 2(11), where the
three individuals had formed a "partnership ... for the purpose of
merging Frankling [County Coal Company] ... with a company listed
on either the New York or American Stock Exchange and then selling
the stock of the listed company as thus acquired."81 In S.E.C. v.
Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc., 82 the court found that a control group ex-
isted apparently because a group of individual shareholders, who had
received Micro stock when their company merged with Micro, had
joined forces to effectuate a distribution of their unregistered Micro
stock. 83 These shareholders had gone so far as to deliver to one per-
son irrevocable powers of attorney to sell the stock. 84
The outcome of the Thompson Ross Securities Co. 85 proceedings is
similar to the results reached by courts in the Dardi and Micro-Moisture
cases. In Thompson, the Commission found that three individuals
who controlled 97 percent of the stock of Continental Cushion Spring
Company constituted a control group for section 2(11) purposes.
While the basis for the group is not readily apparent, it appears to
rest on the fact that the group members agreed to act together in the
distribution of their stock. At one point, the Commission stated:
"There can ... be no question that the registrant [Thompson Ross
Securities Co.] purchased the shares which it initially distributed from
a 'select group of individuals' who controlled the issuer. Their
common aim was to further registrant's. distribution to the public." 8 °
Thus, in Dardi, Micro
-
Moisture and Thompson Ross, a group was
found apparently because the individual shareholders had agreed to
71' See text at notes 80-91 infra.
"° 330 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1964).
"Id. at 321-22.
1' 2 167 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), affd sub nom. SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d
241 (2d Cir. 1959).
" 167 F. Supp. at 738.
" Id. at 721.
85 6 S.E.C. 1111 (1940).
86 Id. at 1119. In SEC v. International Chem. Dev. Corp., 469 F.2d 10 (10th Cir.
1972), Frank Parks was held to be part of a group controlling International Chemical,
The principal basis for this holding appears to be the fact that Parks distributed stock
"at the behest of and in combination with Cardall, an issuer." Id. at 32.
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Id.
cooperate in their distribution of a substantial amount of stock
through an underwriter.
This is not the only situation, however, in which a control group
has been found to exist. Pennaluna & Co. v. S.E.C., 87 for example,
demonstrates that cooperation in other matters can lead to a determi-
nation that a group exists. In that case, the Ninth Circuit found that
Harry F. Magnuson was in control of the Silver Buckle Mining Com-
pany because he was part of a control group. In so finding group
status, the court based its determination on a number of factors. First,
Magnuson was on the board of directors of two companies controlled
by Silver Buckle." Second, Scott and Hull, two of the four persons
the court characterized as "unquestionably in control of Silver
Buckle," had accounts with a securities firm in which Magnuson had a
37.5 percent ownership." In addition, Hull was attorney for Magnu-
son and Magnuson's securities firm." Finally, the other members of
the group had utilized Magnuson to place a substantial block of Silver
Buckle stock in "friendly" hands."' Thus, it is apparent that a network
of business relationships can lead to a determination that a control
group exists.
The fact patterns in Dardi, Micro-Moisture, Thompson Ross and
Pennaluna are not exhaustive of the instances in which an individual
may be deemed a member of a control group. For example, a director
could be deemed part of a group consisting of the board of
directors."2
 Likewise, a family member could be deemed to be a
member of a group consisting of all the members of her family." 3 The
problem with the control group cases, however, is that the typical
analysis is deficient. A control group approach needlessly confuses the
control analysis by focusing on group membership. A more under-
standable approach would be simply to inquire whether the selling
shareholder has the ability to obtain registration. If it is reasonable to
37
 410 F.2d 861 (9th Cir, 1969).
29
 Id. at 866.
29 Id. at 863, 866 n.4.
"Id. at 866 n.4.
9 ' Id.
92
 Former Commissioner Sommer has said that "unless a person or identifiable
group clearly is in control by reason of possession and use of voting power, all directors
and policy-making officers are presumptively members of the controlling group and
only compelling evidence to the contrary should remove them from the group." Som-
mer, supra note 64, at 577. For a suggestion that status as a director raises no presump-
tion of control but rather that it should be "regarded as a red light," see Israels, supra
note 65, at I I. See also It L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 781 (1961).
'3 Sommer, supra note 64, at 580.
[lit is probable that in most cases all members of a family would be re-
garded as prima facie members of the controlling group if by acting in
concert they would have the power to control the issuer,_or if some
member of the family who alone lacked the power to control nevertheless
exercised control. However, it is not difficult to imagine circumstances
which would be effective in rebutting such a prima facie suggestion.
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expect that the selling shareholder could obtain registration, he is a
control person. One's ability to obtain registration, in turn, can be
based on a single relationship or a network of relationships with
others who have some power."' Thus, the focal point of the control
analysis should be the nature of the selling shareholder's relationship
with others involved with the corporation rather than the existence of
a group and membership in that group. For example, a woman may
be classified as a control person because her son and husband own a
majority of the voting stock in a particular corporation. 95 She is a con-
trol person because she reasonably could be expected to enlist the aid
of her family in obtaining registration. To say that she is a control
person because she is a member of a group consisting of the family is
to confuse the analysis needlessly.
Approaching the question of whether one is a control person by
inquiring into the particular seller's ability to obtain registration re-
sults in some clarity. Past relationships and cooperation remain impor-
tant, but past dealings are not utilized as a basis for finding an answer
to the ultimate question of whether there is a control group. Rather,
the past relationships are important as a basis for determining that
the selling shareholder could enlist the cooperation of others in pro-
curing registration. In the same manner, family relationships are also
important. Analytically, however, it is critical to realize that the ulti-
mate question is different. It is not whether there is some ephemeral
body called a "group," the existence of which makes a member subject
to certain special rules; rather, the question is whether a selling
shareholder can, either by direct relationship with the issuer or by a
relationship with other entities that have some power over the issuer,
obtain registration."
This same type of analysis is helpful even if one defines control
as the power to direct management. Only the ultimate question
changes. The power to direct management can come from various
sources, including a relationship with other individuals who have
power. That relationship may enable him to persuade the other indi-
viduals to act on his behalf with respect to the management of the
company. An analysis which focuses on whether the selling sharehold-
er has a relationship with individuals who have the power to direct
management is deficient, however, because it is unclear"' and is not
94 Sec text at notes 64-67 supra.
96 This "attribution" concept is also used in determining beneficial ownership
under § 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970). 31 Fed.
Reg. 1005 (1966).
96
 At least one court appears to have adopted this type of analysis. In Pennaluna,
4 10 F.2d at 866, the court seemed to say that prior relationships between Magnuson
and members of a control group caused Magnuson to become a control person, appar-
ently because those relationships "strongly suggest[ed] his ability to insist upon registra•
Lion."
" See text following note 22 supra.
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philosophically consistent with the congressional intent underlying the
imposition of the registration requirement on control persons."
IV. A TECHNIQUE TO REMEDY THE PRESENT UNCERTAINTY
Notwithstanding the fact that certain general conclusions about
the definition of control can be drawn, the uncertainty that presently
surrounds the question of who is a control person should not be un-
derestimated. Since the Commission has refused to remedy this
uncertainty,99 the courts must fill the vacuum. This task should be
approached with a determination to reduce uncertainty and increase
philosophical consistency."° Two responses would serve to both re-
" See text at notes 19-22 supra.
99 See text following note 22 supra.
'°° Other statutes impose additional constraints and apply various special rules to
persons in control. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a through
jj (1970); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I through 80a-52 (1970);
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa through 77bbbb (1970); Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1970). Commentators generally
accept cases arising under other statutes as at least persuasive authority in secondary
distribution cases. As one pair of commentators has said, "[A] precedent in one area,
while not conclusive in other areas, has considerable value as an analogy." Enstam &
Kamen, Control and the Institutional Investor, 23 Bus. LAW. 289, 305 (1968). See also
Sommer, supra note 64, at 576. In at least two instances, the Commission has indicated
that it will consider definitions of control that have arisen in other statutory settings as
persuasive. In in re The M.A. Hanna Co., 10 S.E.C. 581 (1941), the Commission was
faced with the question of whether the National Steel Corporation was controlled by
Hanna. The issue arose in the context of the Investment Company Act of 1940. 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-52 (1970). In reaching its decision that Hanna was not an invest-
ment company, the Commission relied on cases arising under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 through 79z-6 (1970). In defending the use of
those cases as precedent,.the Commission stated that
[W]hile this phrase ... must be construed in the context in which it is used
and in the light of the general regulatory purposes of that Act, which are
not necessarily the same as those of the Investment Company Act, these
decisions are nevertheless entitled to weight as significant analogies.
In re The M.A. Hanna Co., 10 S.E.C. 581. 589 n.13 (1941). See also, In re The Chicago
Corporation, 28 S.E.C. 463 (1948).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is submitted that cases arising under other stat-
utes, or other sections of the 1933 Act should be considered of limited value in secon-
dary distribution cases. The purposes of the various acts dictate that different types of
entities be classified as control entities and accordingly subject to the special rules under
each act. For example, under the Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb
(1970), an indenture trustee is disqualified from that position if he is under the control
of the issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b)(3) (1970). (For an excellent discussion of the control
concept in the context of the Trust Indenture Act, see In re J.P. Morgan & Co., 10
S.E.C. 119 (1941) ). In determining whether a particular proposed trustee has such a
relationship with the issuer, secondary distribution cases should have little significance.
The purpose for requiring registration of secondary distributions is so foreign to the
purpose for the control concept in the Trust Indenture Act that it is of little preceden-
tial value in determining whether the quantity or quality of control is significant enough
to require registration.
Cases from other areas are valuable to the extent they indicate bases of control.
Thus, for example, the fact that one is a substantial shareholder of a company would
probably be evidence of control under any act. When, however, one is faced with the
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duce uncertainty and increase philosophical consistency: the adoption
of the ability to obtain registration norm as the definition of control
and a re-evaluation of the bases for control in light of that definition.
The key to re-evaluating the bases for control lies in recognizing
that control, which is defined as the ability to obtain registration, can
be based on either power, or persuasion, or both. A selling sharehold-
er may be in control of a corporation either because he has the
power to demand registration or, alternatively, because he has the
ability to persuade those with power to demand registration for him.
One quite obvious basis for the power to demand registration is own-
ership of voting securities. Thus, if a shareholder owns 51 percent of
a corporation's voting stock, he has the power to demand registration.
Additionally, the power to demand registration could be secured
through contractual rights. If, for example, a corporation and its of-
ficers and directors have contractually obligated themselves to accede
to a request by A to file a registration statement, A would appear to
have the power to demand registration and, accordingly, would be a
control person. Proxies could also give a shareholder the power to
demand registration, particularly if the shareholder controlled a ma-
jority of the corporation's stock by proxy. Finally, a management posi-
tion could generate some power to obtain registration. Yet, a single
management position alone does not create sufficient power to demand
registration. Such a position generates only the power to obtain one
signature and some of the information necessary for registration. It
does not guarantee that all the information and signatures necessary
for registration are available.
These examples of the various possible power bases of control
are not necessarily exhaustive. Generally, it should not be especially
difficult to determine whether a selling shareholder has the power to
demand registration. It is simply a question of the shareholder's raw
power to secure the necessary signatures and information. If, through
a combination of factors, such as voting rights, contractual rights,
proxies and management position, he has the power to obtain regis-
tration, he is a control person.
Although determining whether or not a shareholder has the
power to demand registration is relatively simple, determining
whether a selling shareholder has the ability to obtain registration by
persuasion is more difficult. Conceptually, the issue is whether the sell-
ing shareholder has such a significant relationship with a second en-
tity that it reasonably may be assumed that he could enlist the help of
that entity in obtaining registration. If such a relationship exists, the
characteristics of the second entity will be imputed to the selling
more difficult question of determining whether a particular conglomerate of facts con-
stitutes control, cases arising under other statutes generally are of little help. Indeed,
Former Commissioner Sommer stated: "decisions under other statutes must he ex-
amined cautiously, analytically, discriminatingly before concluding they apply on all
fours in situations arising under the '33 and '34 Acts, or before rejecting them as with-
out significance." Sommer, supra note 64, at 576.
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shareholder. Thus, for example, if a selling shareholder has 26 per-
cent of company X's stock and a second entity with whom he has a
significant relationship owns 25 percent, the selling shareholder would
be treated as if he were a 51 percent shareholder of X.
The mechanics of a persuasion analysis are not especially com-
plex. The difficulty lies in determining what situations make it
reasonable to assume that the second entity would aid the selling
shareholder if the shareholder wanted the company to file a registra-
tion statement. Here, relationships obviously play an important role.
It is necessary to evaluate personal, business and family relationships
to determine whether it is reasonable to assume that the selling
shareholder could obtain registration by enlisting the help of other
entities. Since evaluating relationships involves an especially difficult
and subjective judgment, it may be appropriate for courts to develop
certain presumptions. For example, it may be appropriate to presume
that a member of a household could obtain the aid of the other mem-
bers in securing registration.'°' Likewise, persons who have had past,
extensive business associations would seem to be able to secure the as-
sistance of each other in obtaining registration.
The proposed power-persuasion analysis requires a thorough
evaluation of a selling shareholder's characteristics. He may have a
single basis for control, or he may have multiple bases. In the latter
instance, the cumulative effect of his power factors and of his persua-
sion factors must be evaluated. The ultimate consideration, however,
remains constant: Is it reasonable to assume that the shareholder
could obtain registration? Although this proposed analysis does not
remove all uncertainty, it does mitigate the ambiguity that presently
surrounds the question of who is a control person. A philosophy
which is consistent with the congressional intent underlying imposition
of the registration requirement is also thereby established. The bases
for power do not appear especially difficult to isolate. The persuasion
bases, on the other hand, remain somewhat unclear since those bases
rest on a myriad of human relationships. Explication by the courts
and commentators, however, could aid in eliminating much of the un-
certainty.
Nevertheless, even if the entire judiciary were to adopt the
proposed analytical framework, due in part to congested court calen-
dars the necessary development and clarification of the applicable
principles would be a slow process. Thus, there would be interim un-
certainty. Moreover, even after the judiciary has had time to develop
the area, a substantial residuum of uncertainty would remain. In par-
ticular, some uncertainty would continue to surround the definition of
the bases of persuasion, since those bases rest on a fragile network of
human relationships. The ultimate solution to the uncertainty over
who is a control person, therefore, will likely require a legislative or
101 Rule 160 of the Wheat Report, note 72 supra, makes this presumption. See
note 102 infra.
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administrative response in the form of a statutory amendment or new
rule. The Wheat Report proposed one rule, Rule 160. 102 Stated in
general terms, the approach of the Wheat Report is to exclude from
the definition of a control person a seller who is not an officer, direc,
tor, 10 percent shareholder or a person who lacks a substantial rela-
tionship to any of the foregoing.'" Thus, if a selling shareholder has
102  Rule 160 of the Wheat Report, note 72 supra, states:
(a) The phrase "person directly or indirectly controlling ..." as used
in Section 2(11) of the Act, when the issuer is a corporation, shall be
deemed not to include a person who
(I) is neither an executive officer nor a director of such cor-
poration,
(2) does not perform the functions of an executive officer or
director of such corporation,
(3) is not a person owning beneficially, or possessing voting
rights respecting, securities representing more than 10% of the vot-
ing power of such corporation,
(4) is neither father, mother, child, brother, sister or unsepa-
rated spouse of any individual referred to in (1), (2) or (3) above,
(5) is not a creditor of such corporation whose consent is pre-
sently required, or may be required under circumstances within his
control, before changes in the management of the corporation, or
other corporate transactions (apart from payment of dividends, in-
crease in or extension of indebtedness, or the like) may take place.
(b) For the purposes of this rule, the term "executive officer" means
the president, secretary, treasurer, any vice president in charge of a prin-
cipal business function (such as sales, administration or finance) and any
other officer who performs similar policy-making functions f i r the regis-
trant.
(c) As used in (a)(3) above, the term "person" shall include (I) an
individual, (2) his spouse and minor children, (3) any relative of such indi-
vidual or of his spouse who has the same home as such individual, (4) any
trust or estate in which such individual, his spouse, any of his or his
spouse's minor children, and any relative of such individual or of' his
spouse who has the same home as such individual, collectively have a sub-
stantial beneficial interest or as to which any of the foregoing serves as
trustee, executor, or in a similar fiduciary capacity, and (5) any corpora-
tion or other organizations controlled by such individual, his spouse, any
minor child or of such individual or of his spouse, or any relative of such
individual or of his spouse who has the same home as such individual.
(d) In computing the number of outstanding voting securities of any
class held by a person and the total number of all outstanding voting se-
curities of such class, the following shall be included: (I) outstanding se-
curities of the class, (2) all securities or the class into which other securities
beneficially owned by such person are convertible or may (after the pas-
sage of time or upon the happening of any event) be convertible, and (3)
all securities of the class which such person has any call, option, or other
contract right to acquire.
Note: This rule is not intended to imply that persons who do not
come within its terms are for that reason deemed to be "in control" of au
issuer. Thus, depending upon the circumstances of' the individual case, a
person who is a director or who owns more than 10% of the voting se-
curities of a corporation may nevertheless not be "in control" of such cor-
poration.
Id.
"'See id.
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none of these qualities, he is excluded from the definition of control.
On the other hand, if he possesses one or more of these characteris-
tics there is no presumption that he is a control person; rather, it ap-
pears that a determination of whether he is a control person rests on
case law, rules and statutes in effect at the time of his sale.
It is submitted that proposed Rule 160 is unresponsive to the ex-
isting problem of uncertainty in the definition of control. Only in
situations where a selling shareholder has none of the Rule's enumer-
ated characteristics is he excluded from the definition of control. As
the law presently exists, however, the absence of all of the factors de-
lineated in the proposed Rule appears to eliminate any significant
danger of control. Thus, the Rule adds nothing to clarity. Further,
the Rule does not insure philosophical consistency, since it merely de-
fines those individuals who might, upon further analysis, be treated as
control persons. Thus, the rule simply adopts somewhat arbitrary
norms, with apparent disregard for whether the selling shareholder
can or cannot obtain registration.
It is submitted, therefore, that an amendment to the 1933 Act is
the appropriate response to the problem of uncertainty. One benefit
that would inure from a legislative solution to the problem of uncer-
tainty is that it would provide an opportunity for a thoughtful re-
evaluation and balancing of the complex values involved in a rule re-
quiring registration by persons other than issuers, underwriters and
dealers. One of the more pressing considerations toward which the
rule is directed is the protection of the public from the sale of large
blocks of stock where adequate information about the company is un-
available. Yet, it would seem unfair to apply significant constraints to
small sales of stock by shareholders, for the cost of insuring com-
pliance would be intolerable for most small shareholders and unneces-
sarily burdensome on corporations if they were required to comply
with a registration demand each time a small block of stock changed
hands. Moreover, imposing a significant restraint on the negotiability
of such securities could have an adverse impact on the capital mar-
kets, since investors would be less likely to purchase stock if there are
significant constraints on resale. The benefits of protective disclosure
of information could be balanced against the pernicious effects of
over-regulation, however, by imposing a constraint on secondary dis-
tributions only when the size of an anticipated sale creates significant
dangers. For example, Congress might enact legislation making the
Act's registration requirement applicable to sales by persons other
than issuers, underwriters, or dealers only if the selling shareholder
sells more than a certain amount of stock in any given period of
time.'°4
 To guarantee fairness to the selling shareholder, Congress
104
 Existing Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1976), takes a similar approach. If a
control person is able to meet the other requirements of the Rule, he can sell the lesser
of "one percent of the shares of the classs outstanding ... or the average weekly
reported volume of trading in such securities on all securities exchanges ... during the
four calendar weeks preceding ...." Filing of the required notice. Id. Rule 144, how-
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also should insure that he can obtain registration, if it becomes desir-
able or necessary. A requirement that the issuer accede to a selling
shareholder's demand for registration would provide the necessary in-
surance. Fairness also suggests, however, that in return the issuer
should receive reasonable compensation for the costs of
registration.' ° 5
A further benefit of this legislative proposal is that it would
serve to reduce uncertainty significantly. Currently, selling sharehold-
ers are treated unfairly because they are often unable to determine
with any substantial degree of certainty whether they are subject to
the registration requirement. This unfairness is exacerbated by the
liabilities attached to a violation of the registration requirements. 1 p"
The inequities of the present situation are further accentuated by the
legal costs associated with the sale of a control block. With good se-
curities lawyers charging at least fifty dollars an hour for their time, the
legal costs associated with the sale of securities can be significant.
Moreover, if the shareholder falls into the large grey area in which
existence of control is uncertain, legal advice is guaranteed to be
costly. Extra care on the part of the attorney translates into increased
costs to the client.
The present uncertainty has other undesirable impacts as well. It
has been stated that uncertainty provides "unfortunate leeway for the
unscrupulous."'" It should be added that it also provides unfortunate
leeway for the reckless. Shareholders with a low respect for the law
and a high propensity to take risks will fail to register. Conversely,
those shareholders with a high respect for the law and a low propen-
ever, is not an adequate substitute for the proposals made in the text of this article.
First, because of the Rule's specific requirements, it will not always be available to the
control person. Secondly, the Rule does not insure that large sales of stock by sharehokl-
ers will be subjected to the registration provisions. For example, if one assumes that a
person with less than 10% of the stock of a corporation would not be considered a con-
trol person, a 9% shareholder could sell all his stock with impunity, while a 10%
shareholder can sell only 1%. If the philosophy underlying the constraints on a control
person is designed to protect against large blocks of stock being sold without proper
disclosures, the constraints of Rule 144 do not work precisely. This becomes even more
apparent when it is recalled that the same rules apply to the sales of General Motors
stock and the stock of a small corporation. This means that a 9% shareholderof Gen-
eral Motors may be able to sell his stock, while a 10% shareholder of a small corpora-
tion would be able to sell only 1%.
in This statutory alteration would require modifications to existing statutes and
rules. For example, Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1976), would have to be amended.
See note 104 supra. Also, it might be appropriate for the Commission to make Rule
146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1976), which provides an exemption from registration for
certain issues that do not involve a public distribution of securities, and Rule 147, 17
C.F.R. 230.147 (1976), which provides an exemption from registration for "intrastate"
offerings, available to shareholders subject to the registration requirements.
1 ° 6
 Under § 12(1) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 771(1) (1970), failure to comply with the
registration requirements generates rescision liability. Thus, if the selling shareholder
sells one million dollars worth of securities, he is liable for that amount. Obviously, this
factor increases the unfairness of the uncertainty.
"'The Wheat Report, supra note 72, at 177.
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sky to take risks will register. This result is unfair to the scrupulous
risk-averter. It also is unsound as a policy matter. The shareholder is
given unnecessary discretion to determine when registration is ap-
propriate. Thus, the public's protection often is determined not by the
need for registration but rather by the risk aversion tendencies of the
selling shareholders. A legislative solution to the present uncertainty
surrounding the question of who is a control person would thus pro-
vide an opportunity not only to re-evaluate and balance the complex
values involved in imposing registration on control persons, but also
would serve to eliminate the uncertainty and its undesirable by-
produCts of high legal costs and unsound policy.
V. CONCLUSION
A few years ago, the Commission was vulnerable to a claim of
callous indifference to the need for clarity in the 1933 Act. In the last
five years, however, the Commission has made a major effort to re-
duce the Act's uncertainty in many areas. Specifically, the promulga-
tion of Rules 144, 108 146, 101 147," 0 237, 1 " and 240 12 has signifi-
cantly reduced the Act's uncertainty. In one area, however, the Com-
mission has been unexplainedly meek. The Commission has failed to
clarify the circumstances under which persons, other than issuers, un-
derwriters and dealers, are subject to the Act's registration require-
ments. The failure to act is perhaps due to the Wheat Report's un-
satisfactory proposal." 3 Nevertheless, the Commission should pursue
its quest for understandable norms. To this end, at least two courses
of action are available. The Commission could attempt to define the
term control more precisely. Alternatively,' it could recommend legis-
lation similar to that advocated by this article. Whichever procedure is
adopted, however, the need for affirmative action is clear.
'°" 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1976). See note 104 supra.
' 11 " 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1976). See note 105 supra.
"" 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1976). See note 105 supra.
1 " 17 C.F.R. § 230.237 (1976). This rule permits resales of restricted securities
after five years.
"2
 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (1976). This rule exempts from registration sales of a lim-
ited amount of stock by small corporations.
13 See text at notes 102-103 supra.
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